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Abstract 
Thanks to "smart grids", consumers will gradually become active players in electricity markets, 
especially by voluntarily decreasing their consumption when receiving scarcity messages from the 
market operator. For a fast and efficient transition to a more dynamic industry, the regulatory and 
pricing scheme used both for the endowment of consumers with curtailment rights and the exercise of 
the options must decentralize the socially optimal dispatching. In particular, the options must be 
acquired at the retail price. This price is to be an income for the suppliers of energy who have 
defaulted or who have been withdrawn from the initial dispatch. When exercised, the options of load 
shedding are to be rewarded at the wholesale price paid by defaulting producers. The volume of the 
options must be allocated to each consumer taking into account his ability to manipulate information 
on his profile of consumption and his ability to modify the profile. 
Keywords 
Energy efficiency, Load management, Industrial economics, Power generation economics, Supply and 
demand, Innovation management 
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I. Introduction 
The need to balance the electric power system in real time to account for the non-storability of 
electricity is the main explanation for vertical integration in the sector, either structurally or 
contractually. Non-storability also explains the secondary role traditionally given to demand in the 
physical balancing of the power system. However, the inclusion of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) in "smart networks" suggests drastic changes in the near term, providing 
consumers with a more active role, thus making the whole system more efficient. 
Balancing the electric power system has long been a centralized matter, usually achieved by: 
  large outages or rolling and selective blackouts, methods still daily experienced in many 
developing countries; 
  the installation of operational reserves called to ensure a given level of security of supply, often 
defined in terms of blackout duration. 
Nevertheless, large consumers are interested in a better control of their energy bills. Since their 
electricity withdrawal has a significant impact on total demand, producers have progressively 
proposed contracts including negotiated curtailment clauses. Under this contractual arrangement, the 
value of electricity signals the time and duration of selective curtailments. When negotiating a contract 
to supply low price electricity, the electricity producer buys an option on the production of negawatt-
hours (NWh)
1
 (load shedding) that are cheaper than the production of the additional megawatt-hours 
(MWh) necessary to balance the system without consumers' participation. For its part, a client that can 
decrease his consumption pays a lower bill under the condition that he will either stop consuming 
energy or switch to alternative sources upon request.  
The total load-shedding potential is much larger than the capacity offered by large consumers.
2
 
Every consumer can be disconnected at low damage for dates, durations and quantities varying with 
his equipment and preferences. The barrier is the cost of implementation. The installation of ICT 
devices for the remote control of consumption equipment by specialized service providers overcomes 
this obstacle. It is now technically possible to produce large-scale distributed load-shedding. 
Additionally, to meet environmental constraints and requirements in energy saving, the active 
participation of consumers is increasingly seen as politically desirable, especially voluntary load-
shedding. For a successful participation of consumers in system balancing, technology is not 
sufficient. It also takes economic rules allowing to decentralize the efficient dispatch. This is the topic 
we address in this paper.  
In section II we use an elementary discrete model to present the basic problem of how to 
decentralize efficient demand decreases in the resolution of an energy imbalance. We show that the 
possibility of exercising an option to discontinue consumption can approximate the optimal production 
peak, provided that this option is acquired at the retail price and rewarded at the spot price. 
Interruptible consumers appear as suppliers of NWh, competing against the suppliers of additional 
MWh. Section III reconsiders the same problem using a more general framework. We assume that the 
surplus function and the cost function of electricity are continuous. Therefore we can derive and 
analyze the functions of electricity supply, electricity demand and shedding supply. Again, we show 
that consumers must pay the retail price of the no-consumption options they exercise and that they 
must be remunerated at the price of the real-time market. The firms responsible for the necessity to re-
dispatch must acquire at the price of the real-time market the electricity they sell at the retail price. In 
                                                     
1
 Joskow and Marron [4] and [5] 
2
 For an overview on how to implement demand response, see Borenstein et al. [1]. Torriti et al. [7] give details about 
demand response experiences in some European countries. 
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Section V we discuss how to quantify the load-shedding capacity. When he signs his electricity 
contract, the consumer rationally anticipates that he will be able to use some of the purchased energy 
options not for consumption but for sale to the system operator. With linear price contracts this 
expectation provokes oversubscription, only limited by the cost of the shedding equipment and the 
uncertainty on the real-time price.  
II. MW vs. NW to correct unexpected imbalances 
Consider a competitive day-ahead market in equilibrium at price p. The Market Operator (MO) 
informs all bidders about their rights and duties at this price:  
i) consumers who have bid below p and producers who have bid above p will not be served and 
called;  
ii) the others will have to withdraw or inject what they have committed to.  
Let u be the use value of one MWh of electricity and c the production cost. Denoting by n the last 
demand bid served and by m the last supply bid called at equilibrium, given that the efficient ranking 
of bids by the MO follows the merit order, we have that 
n mu p c  , where 1 1andn n m mu u c c   . 
A. Optimal adjustment 
One of the m producers supposed to be active at equilibrium informs the MO that he will fail to deliver 
1MWh. There are two elementary rebalancing solutions:  
 either the MO calls the last non planned producer to supply the missing MWh : it will cost 1mc  ,  
 or the MO asks the planned consumer with the lowest electricity valuation to reduce its demand by 
1MWh ; the cost is the lost gross surplus nu .  
It is clear that the least costly adjustment rule is: 
call producer 1m  if 1m nc u   
curtail consumer n  if 1m nc u  . 
B. Decentralized adjustment 
Assume that there is no organized market for rebalancing. The defaulting producer is obliged by law 
to find a solution by himself. If he organizes an auction between available producers to buy the 
missing quantity, competition will drive the adjustment price to 1a mp c  . With this solution, the 
defaulting producer is like a supplier without generation assets buying from a wholesale market and 
selling at price p as he had committed. His net loss is 1 0a mp p c p    . The second possibility is to 
propose a compensation r to one of his customers because she will not be served. The producer prefers 
to buy the missing production if 1mr c p   and to propose a deal to a consumer otherwise. This 
decision is in line with the optimal adjustment portrayed in paragraph A only if nr u p  . Therefore, 
the power-cut deal must be concluded with customer n, the one with the lowest willingness-to-pay 
who holds the right to consume. Moreover n must be only compensated for her net surplus. 
Consequently, if customer n has already paid the market price p to the defaulting producer and if she is 
called to rebalance the system, the producer must pay her nu  so that she is rewarded nu p  for no 
consuming. 
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In the near future, real-time markets will have candidates to load-shedding competing against 
reserve producers to solve market imbalances. Big consumers will intervene directly whereas small 
consumers will delegate decision to aggregators. If we want this pure market adjustment process to 
decentralize the optimum, candidates to rebalancing must satisfy the following necessary conditions: 
 producers shall have the capacity to produce in hand, 
 consumers shall own rights on the quantity they intend to renounce, which means they pay to 
acquire them at the consumption price p.  
On such a market, competition between consumers who can decrease withdrawals and producers who 
can increase injections gives the equilibrium price  1min ,a n mp u c  . 
The basic mechanism we have examined so far can be analyzed more rigorously using standard 
microeconomic tools. This has been done by Chao (see [2]) who shows how voluntary load-shedding 
helps to correct the inefficiency of time unvarying electricity prices. Chao emphasizes the necessity to 
impose that consumers pay the same retail price for the electricity they do consume and the electricity 
they renounce, contrary to what is done in some countries where put options are not paid.
3
 In the next 
section we go deeper into the study of the rebalancing process when some capacity of production is 
missing whereas it was announced as available.  
III. Efficient re-dispatching and financial clearing 
When it comes to solve an unexpected imbalance between supply and demand, the producers able to 
increase their output and the clients able to consume less than their profile are competing against each 
other. The source of the problem can be an unexpected large consumption. We instead focus on the 
role of demand response when a producer who had been registered in the merit order fails to fulfill its 
commitments. The timing is as follows: i) the MO plans the optimal dispatch at the level *q , ii) in real 
time it appears that the producers who had committed to provide energy in the interval ,q q D    
where *q D q   fail to do so. How does the MO best organize the re-dispatching? 
A. Optimal re-dispatching 
Let  U q  be the aggregate gross surplus from the consumption of the quantity q. It is a continuous and 
differentiable, increasing and concave function. Let  C q  be the aggregate cost of producing the 
quantity q. It is a continuous and differentiable, increasing and convex function. If the absence of 
produced energy is the only element to be taken into account, re-dispatching consists in solving 
     
0,
max ' ' s.t.
g
c g
q q
c c g
q Dq q
U q C q dq C q dq q q D

 
     
   
where cq  is the quantity consumed and gq  the index of the marginal producer in the initial merit 
order. The optimal quantity consumed is therefore **q  such that ** **'( ) '( )U q C q D   and **q D  is the 
index of the marginal producer. The result is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
                                                     
3
 As Ruff [6] says " Normal markets allow consumers to sell what they do not consume as long as they own it, but no 
rational market pays consumers for not consuming what they do not own, even if they can prove that they would have 
bought it but didn’t. Paying somebody because they might have bought more but didn’t is as illogical, unfair, and 
inefficient as buying the Brooklyn Bridge from somebody who thought about buying it but decided to sell it instead." See 
also Hogan [3]. 
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Fig. 1. Optimal redispatching after a production default. 
 
The missing quantity D forces the market operator to consider a merit order of producers "shifted 
leftwards", entailing a system marginal cost "shifted upwards", from '( )C q  to ' ( )C q  starting from the 
quantity q . 
As compared with *q , redispatching yields a two-fold adjustment : 
- consumption is reduced from 
*q  to 
**q   
- production is adjusted by calling producers between 
*q  and 
**q D . 
These two parts of the adjustment are perfectly symmetric: new producers are called into the new 
merit order starting from the plants with the smallest relative marginal cost and consumers decrease 
their consumption in the demand merit order starting from electricity with the lowest value. There is a 
collective loss of efficiency, since the market operator is forced to do without production units that 
were placed in a good position in the merit order to produce D. In terms of surplus, the social loss is 
equal to the sum of the gross surplus decrease due to reduced consumption (area A) and the cost 
increase due to the production by plants that were not in the initial dispatch (area B).  
B. Constrained redispatching 
It may happen that the new dispatch has to comply with some additional constraints, in particular the 
short term inelasticity of supply and demand. We consider successively the case where consumption 
cannot be reduced and the case where production cannot be adjusted. 
• If it is mandatory to supply *q  to consumers, the market operator can just call production plants 
that were formerly out of merit up to reaching the quantity *q D . The social loss is more 
important than in the former case since there is an additional constraint. Geometrically, in Fig. 1 
surface A is reduced to 0 and surface B is increased up to the value corresponding to the 
quantity *q D . As marginal cost is increasing and marginal utility is decreasing, the additional 
cost 
*
**
'( )
q D
q D
C q dq

  is larger than the gain in utility 
*
**
'( )
q
q
U q dq  represented by surface A. 
• If there is no way to call reserve production after the announcement that D  is missing, the only 
solution consists in reducing consumption from *q  to *q D . The social loss is then exclusively 
represented by the absent utility 
*
*
'( )
q
q D
U q dq
 , that is surface A stretched leftwards to 
*q D  . 
When feasible, the solution that consists in combining consumption reduction and production by 
reserves is generically more efficient than those based on one single side of the market. Nevertheless, 
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we see from Fig. 1 that the good dose for the two adjustments depends on the slopes of the curves 'U  
and 'C . Thus, if in the neighborhood of *q  the curve 'U  is very steep and/or if the curve 'C  is nearly 
horizontal, it is optimal not to reduce consumption and to exclusively rely on reserve plants. 
Conversely, if in the neighborhood of *q  the marginal cost is strongly increasing and/or 'U  is almost 
horizontal, the optimal solution essentially requires reduced consumption. 
C. Implementation by market mechanisms 
Decentralizing the optimal mechanism described above requires a market for adjustment on top of the 
spot market. The production failure D  occurs after *q  is planned. Therefore transactions settled 
initially are to be cleared at the spot price    * * *' 'p U q C q   and only quantity D is to be paid at the 
real-time price.
4
  
The producers participating in this market are those with a marginal cost above *'( )C q . We assume 
that they cannot influence the real-time price 
ap . Their supply is the solution to the problem 
 
*
*
max '
q q
a
qq
p q C q dq

  . From the first order condition, we can write the supply of adjustment by 
generators as    ' 1 *g a aq p C p q
  , which is an increasing function of 
ap  since marginal cost is 
increasing given the merit order implemented by the market operator. 
The consumers participating in this market are those with a marginal surplus above  *'U q . They 
also are price takers. Their adjustment supply is the solution to the problem  
     
*
*
* * *max '
q
a
q qq
U q p q p q U q dq

        (1) 
since their cost is the loss of utility for the units not consumed between *q q  and *q . From the first 
order condition, we can write the supply of adjustment by consumers as    * ' 1c a aq p q U p
  , which 
is an increasing function of 
ap  since marginal utility is a decreasing function of consumption and the 
candidates to shedding are called by the market operator according to the merit order. 
The equilibrium price is the solution *
ap  of the equality between the demand for adjustment D and 
the supply by both types of agents    g a c aq p q p D  . That is 
   ' 1 * ' 1 *a aC p U p D   .  
At this price, from Fig. 1 it is clear that  * * **c aq p q q   and  * ** *g aq p q D q   . 
                                                     
4
 When the failure D is known ex ante as in Chao [2], the equilibrium of the electricity market is reached at the spot price 
paid by all consumers and received by all active producers. Defaulting producers are simply removed from the merit 
order without further consequence. 
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D. Financial clearing 
Let us now examine the financial accounts of the agents in the day-ahead and adjustment markets. To 
get a clear view of the expenditures and revenues, we assume in Table 1 that financial flows transit 
through the accounts of the MO and the MO does not retain any profit from these adjustments.  
The accounts of the non-defaulting planned producers are easily understandable: they produce what 
they agreed to sell *q D  at the price of the initial program *p . The planned consumers are allowed to 
consume *q  paid at the unit price *p , but they only consume **q . The producers initially located 
between *q  and **q D  are called to replace (partially) the defaulting producers who were located 
between q  and q D . They are paid the adjustment price *
ap  for every unit they produce. 
Consumers diminish their consumption by the quantity * **q q , which gives them the revenue 
 * * **ap q q . The cost incurred to obtain this gain can be presented in two ways:  
* globally the curtailed consumers lose the utility they could benefit from their consumption, 
   * **U q U q  (area A in Fig. 1).  
* analytically this cost can be split into two parts: i) the loss of net utility  
*
**
* * **'( )
q
q
U q dq p q q   
which is what the consumers would have received absent any consumption drop and ii), the 
settlement of the invoice  * * **p q q  needed to acquire the option to do so. 
On top of the importance of a price signal reflecting the value of energy to pilot the consumer's choice, 
the economic rationality of the payment  * * **p q q  is common with all market transactions: an 
economic agent can sell only what he or she owns or what he or she can produce. Production facilities 
called up to ** *q D q   must be paid  * ** *ap q D q   because they own the technology to produce this 
volume and they bear the related cost. Consumers do not own production facilities. They are entitled 
to the receipt of  * * **ap q q  only if they hold property rights on the quantity * **q q , either by paying 
the bill  * * **p q q  when they registered for their consumption profile, or because they commit to pay 
in the future. 
This interpretation in terms of property law is highlighted by Chao (see [2]). We can reach the 
same conclusion thinking in terms of the commitments made at the initial dispatching program: 
 planned producers commit to provide energy (and expect to receive the corresponding gain); 
 planned consumers commit to withdraw energy (and pay the corresponding bill, at that time or in 
the future); 
 any discrepancy with respect to the initial plan must be corrected by the MO and the financial 
consequences must be cleared accordingly. 
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Table I 
Revenue and Expenditure Flows 
 
Firms that have committed to provide the quantity of energy *q  do so, either by producing or by 
paying the unit price *
ap  to acquire the energy D they are short of. Consumers who have committed to 
take *q  paid at price *p  consume **q  and exercise their put option on the quantity * **q q  sold at 
price *
ap .  
Table 1 shows that given the different financial inflows and outflows listed in the account of the 
market operator, it remains a positive balance equal to *p D . To balance the MO’s books, *p D  must 
be transferred to the defaulting producers (see the arrow in Fig. 1). Indeed, they have committed to 
produce D in the initial dispatch, so they are entitled to pocket *p D . The difference with the other 
producers is that they fulfill their obligation not with their own energy but with energy produced by 
others ** *q D q   and non consumed energy * **q q , both paid at price *ap . They are in the same 
position as a supplier without generation assets, obliged to buy from an external source. 
By aggregating the two accounts of the consumers, we find that their net utility is 
   ** * * ** * *aU q p q q p q   . On the other side of the markets, by aggregating the three accounts of the 
firms, we obtain their net profit 
   * * * * ** **( ) ( ) ( )ap q p q q C q D C q D C q          
Doing so brings up compactly the settlement of the bills of the subscribed electricity * *p q  and the 
payment of the curtailment bill  * * **ap q q . 
To conclude this section, it is useful to revisit the pivotal role of the price paid to acquire put 
options on NWh. If this price was only the knife used to share the rent between consumers and 
producers, its value would be irrelevant from an efficiency point of view. However, it affects the 
decisions of the agents, like any purchase or sale price. As was already noticed in the discrete model of 
Claude Crampes and Thomas-Olivier Léautier 
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section II, market implementation of the first best requires consumers to pay for the right to resell their 
consumption.  
To confirm that, suppose consumers pay only the day-ahead price for their actual consumption. 
Instead of problem (1) they solve 
     
*
*
* * *max '
q
a
q qq
U q p q q p q U q dq

     . 
The first order condition is    * *' aU q q p p   , as if no-consumption were rewarded twice. This 
yields an excess supply of adjustment by consumers as compared with the first best. Therefore, the put 
options on NWh must not be given for free to electricity consumers.  
In section IV, we show that even though the pricing rule is correct, load-shedding creates a moral 
hazard problem. 
E. Numerical illustration 
Suppose that the buy bids are aggregated into the willingness-to-pay function  ' 100U q q   and the 
sell bids into the marginal cost function  'C q q . Equating the two functions, we obtain the 
equilibrium planned quantity * 50q  MWh and the equilibrium price * 50p  €/MWh. Suppose now 
that planned producers inform the MO that 20MW of capacity are out of order. In the adjustment 
market, the producers that were not in the initial merit order will propose to produce up to the point 
where the marginal cost  *'C q q is equal to the adjustment price ap . Then the supply of adjustment 
by reserve producers is   50g a aq p p  . On the other side, consumers are ready to decrease their 
consumption down to the point where their willingness-to-pay  *'U q q  is equal to ap . Then the 
supply of adjustment by consumers is   50c a aq p p  . Equating the total supply    c a g aq p q p  with 
the 20MWh of missing energy, we obtain the equilibrium adjustment price * 60ap  €/MWh. At that 
price 10MWh are produced by reserve producers and consumers reduce their consumption by 10MW. 
The actual consumption is equal to the actual production, that is ** 40q  MW. The defaulting 
producers receive 500€ from non-curtailed consumers and 500€ from curtailed consumers, both 
paying the initial price * 50p  . The defaulting producers provide the former with 10MWh coming 
from the reserve producers paid at price * 60ap   and they pay the latter the same price for not 
providing them with 10MW. Therefore the net loss of the defaulting producers is 200€ and the net 
profit of curtailed consumers is 100€. 
IV. Strategic behavior of consumers in demand response programs 
Consider a consumer that chooses the quantity of electricity purchased q and the fraction consumed 
cq . The problem can be solved in two different ways. The naïve solution assumes that the consumer 
does not behave strategically: he simply chooses a consumption profile given the offer price, and later 
adapts his consumption level if a profitable curtailment opportunity occurs. By contrast, the 
opportunistic solution incorporates the value of the acquired curtailment rights in the consumer's 
choice. These two solutions are presented successively below. 
A. Non-strategic consumer 
If the consumer is myopic, he solves the following sequence: 
i) he first chooses the planned level of consumption given the MWh price p:  max
q
U q pq , 
which determines the demand for energy  q p  ; 
ii) upon observing the reward for consumption reduction ap , he then allocates his purchase  q p  
between the consumption of MWh and the sale of NWh by solving   
Distributed Load-Shedding in the Balancing of Electricity Markets 
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  max ( )
c
c c
a
q
U q p q p q  . 
In this case, the consumer’s demand response is well in line with the decentralization of both the 
optimal dispatch  'U q p  and the optimal redispatch '( )c aU q p . In reality, consumers are strategic, 
or more simply, they are not totally myopic. They take their decisions anticipating the opportunity of 
rewarded curtailment, which produces a different outcome. 
B. Strategic consumers facing certain adjustment prices 
Assume that the consumer can perfectly forecast the adjustment price 
ap  at the time he orders the 
quantity q. He thus solves 
,
max ( ) ( ) s.t.
c
c c c
a
q q
U q p q q pq q q     
The solution proceeds backwards: first the consumer chooses cq  given the quantity of electricity 
subscribed q, then he chooses q. 
i) For every value q chosen at the subscription time, the quantity actually consumed is the solution to  
max ( ) ( ) s.t.
c
c c c
a
q
U q p q q q q    
Consumption is therefore  ,c aq p q  such that  
    , 0c aq p q     if '(0)ap U  
     ' 1, ( )c a aq p q U p
   if '(0) '( )aU p U q   
    ,c aq p q q    if '( ) aU q p . 
This function is represented in the left panel of Fig. 2. The right panel shows the load reduction, that is 
the supply of NWh, obtained by subtracting consumption  ,c aq p q  from the energy purchased q. The 
two curves are obviously dependent on the quantity subscribed q. 
Fig. 2. Demand for electricity consumption, and supply of electricity curtailment 
 
ii) Consider now the ex ante problem. At the moment where the consumer decides on the subscribed 
quantity of electricity q, he must solve:  
     max , ,c ca a a
q
U q p q p q q p q pq    
Knowing the first order condition that will prevail ex post, we have from paragraph i) above that 
 '( ) 0
c
c
a
dq
U q p
dq
   for all  'ap U q . Consequently the derivative of the consumer's objective 
function with respect to q is just equal to   0ap p  . It means that the consumer facing a potential 
arbitrage between consuming at price p and the adjustment market at price ap  is encouraged to bid for 
a very high demand of energy with the objective to resell a lot of NWh on the adjustment market. 
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Several safeguards will actually limit this disproportionate demand of energy, including the 
dimension of the electric equipment that makes too high consumption claims non-credible. Hereafter, 
we consider another limit, the uncertainty on the price of the adjustment market. 
C. Strategic consumers facing uncertain adjustment prices 
Suppose that, when the consumer chooses the subscribed quantity q at price p, the adjustment price 
ap  
is uncertain. Nevertheless, it will be known when choosing the quantity consumed cq . The problem is 
 0max max ( ) ( ) . . ( )c c c ca aq q U q p q q s t q q dF p pq

     
where ( )aF p  is the distribution of probability of the price on the adjustment market. Since the 
consumer knows 
ap  at the time to fix the supply of NWh, the demand of electricity consumption 
remains the function  ,c aq p q  constructed previously.  
Then the ex ante problem is  
 
'( )
0
'(0)
'( )
max ( ) ( )
( ( , )) ( , ( )
U q
a
q
U
c c
a a a a
U q
pq U q dF p
U q p q p q q p q dF p
 
   
 


 
Contrary to the case of paragraph B above, we can now obtain an interior positive solution q  to this 
problem. It is determined by the first order condition  
'( )
'( ) ( '( )) ( )a a
U q
U q F U q p dF p p

   
In effect, the last unit bought is paid p and it will be used either for consumption (if the price
ap  is too 
low) or for resale, which will generate 
ap  in the states of nature where the put option is exercised, that 
is when '( )ap U q . 
When there is a positive probability that the put will not be exercised, uncertainty limits the 
purchase of electricity options devoted to curtailment. Nevertheless, purchases remain larger than for 
non-strategic consumers since the quantity subscribed q  is not only determined by  ' .U  and p, but 
also by the distribution of probabilities of 
ap . This excess purchase can be easily proven by rewriting 
the above first order condition as  
 
'( )
'( ) '( ) ( ) 0a a
U q
U q p U q dF p p

     
Consequently '( ) 0U q p  , instead of  *' 0U q p   at first best. Therefore,    *' 'U q U q  and, 
since  .U  is concave, *q q .  
For each possible level of the energy price, in particular the price *p  that implements first best, the 
consumer buys more than he plans to consume. This incentive to order an excessive quantity of 
electricity depresses ex post the price of the adjustment market as can be seen from the right panel of 
Fig. 2: the vertical segment of the supply of NWhs is shifted rightwards (from *q  to q ), the intercept 
with the vertical axis decreases (from  *'U q  to  'U q ) and the increasing part of the function moves 
accordingly downwards and rightwards. Then, for any demand function of adjustment by the market 
operator to the consumers holding put options, the equilibrium price on the adjustment market 
ap  will 
be lower than the efficient one *
ap .  
The strategic behavior of consumers has two adverse effects: 
 a disruption in the merit order, since some candidates to load-shedding will be inserted into the 
queue before production plants whose cost is lower than the lost utility; 
 an equilibrium price too low in the adjustment market, which distorts the incentives to invest. 
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To avoid this opportunistic bias, the decisions of the consumers must be considered within a dynamic 
process taking into account the incentives to hide information and to change the unobservable 
consumption decisions. To reduce strategic behavior (adverse selection and moral hazard) the retail 
electricity suppliers should offer contracts with nonlinear prices for packets of energy, each packet 
containing a pair of variable price and guarantee of supply that plays the same role as an index of 
quality. Consumers could thus self-select within this menu, revealing their private information about 
the true intensity of their need for electricity. From contract theory, we know that first best cannot be 
reached with the result that consumers will keep information rents. Nevertheless, a menu of 
subscriptions with pairs of variable prices and delivery guarantees would largely outperform uniform 
linear prices. 
V. Conclusion 
Increasing the flexibility of the demand for electricity should be a priority. The ever rising cost of 
fossil fuels and the growing importance of environmental externalities prohibit the business as usual 
approach: simply keep investing in production facilities to meet a price insensitive demand. 
The Information and Communication Technologies applied to electrical networks allow us to 
expect significant changes in demand response in the near future. As consumers become more 
concerned with their energy bill and are increasingly able to delegate the control of their consumption 
to service providers, we will gradually reach a state of the industry where demand plays a fully active 
role in the balancing process. We must therefore encourage R&D leading to the installation of 
electronic tools allowing consumers to control their demand efficiently.  
The solution is not just technical. It also requires a regulatory environment that respects the 
principles of an efficient allocation of resources, which means, in a market economy, a system of 
rights and fees that can decentralize optimal dispatch and re-dispatch. When consumers are allowed to 
freely choose either to consume or to be paid for not consuming, the quantity of put options they 
acquire, the price they pay to acquire them and the price they receive when they exercise them must be 
objective and verifiable to be included in detailed subscription contracts. The legal framework for 
firms that will develop the service of distributed load-shedding must also be clearly defined since they 
will progressively acquire a lot of information on the behavior of consumers and they will intervene at 
critical periods under the supervision of the market operator. 
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